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STATE EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES IN
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION
MARTIN I. KA.MINSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
T O what extent may a witness successfully invoke a state-created
evidentiary privilege as a ground for refusing to answer questions
in federal litigation, particularly in federal question cases? The answer
to this question has long proven to be a Gordian knot for legal
scholars, federal legislators and the courts. Most recently the
draftsmen of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress found themselves
mired in the morass of conflicting views and policy considerations
which underlie the patchwork of decisions on the question. The result
is that those rules, as adopted by Congress and signed into law, leave
the matter where it presently lies under case law and do not decree
specific "federal" privileges as the draftsmen had originally proposed. I
To a great extent, the problem involves a selection of the
philosophical considerations which one believes most appropriate for
our system of federal courts, and, to a lesser extent, our entire federal
governmental system. That is, one must choose between uniformity
within the federal court system and the right of a citizen to expect the
same treatment in the federal courts in his state that he receives from
the state courts; and between the interest of full disclosure in the
federal courts and a state's interest in fostering selected confidential
relationships by encouraging its citizens to rely on the inviolability of
their disclosures to doctors, lawyers, spouses, accountants, journalists
or others.
This Article will survey the problem and comment on the various
solutions, both for diversity and federal question litigation, which have
been fashioned or advocated thus far by courts, commentators, and
the draftsmen and critics of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Essentially
the Article concludes that: (a) in diversity cases, unless contrary to
federal substantive public policy, state evidentiary privileges should
prevail; 2 (b) in federal question cases, the federal courts should be free
to fashion their own rules on a case-by-case basis, but should carefully
scrutinize state law and defer to strong state public policies on the
matter absent overriding federal policy to the contrary or manifest
* B.A. Yale University, 1962; LL.B. Harvard University, 1965. Member of the New York
Bar.
1. See Part V infra.
2. See Part III infra.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
inequity;3 and (c) the foregoing conclusions are consistent with the
present status of both case law and statutory law. 4 However, caution
must be exercised in attempting to follow or flatly state such
generalized conclusions, since federal litigation tends to generate un-
foreseen "sport" situations, as where a deposition is taken in one state
for use in a federal trial in another state, but only one of the two states
recognizes the claimed privilege. 5
II. THE PROBLEM IN ITS HISTORICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
As early as 300 years ago, the courts in England recognized the right
of citizens, in certain circumstances, to refuse to answer questions in
court regarding matters learned or divulged in exchange for a promise
of confidentiality. 6 The scope of such privileges was never codified by
statute and, as the years passed, several evidentiary or testimonial
privileges gave way under the English common law to a judicial
philosophy in favor of full disclosure designed to insure that justice not
be subverted by a constricted court review of all the pertinent evi-
dence. 7
Our state legislatures and courts have, for more than two centuries,
continued to recognize and create specific privileges against disclo-
3. See Part IV infra.
4. As shown below (see notes 126-39 infra and accompanying text), this view appears to be
essentially in accord with that of the Senate Judiciary Committee and to a lesser extent the House
Judiciary Committee, but contradicts the view of the Advisory Committee which drafted the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See notes 112-18 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 43-56, 85-92 infra and accompanying text.
6. Trial of Lord Grey, 9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682); Bulstrod v. Letchmere, 22 Eng. Rep. 1019
(Ch. 1676). Thereafter, in the eighteenth century, the English courts, in dealing with the
attorney-client privilege, observed: "[A]s business multiplied and became more intricate, and
titles more perplexed, both the distance of places, and the multiplicity of business, made it
absolutely necessary that there should be a set of people who should stand in the place of the
suitors, and these persons are called attornies [sic]. Since this has been thought necessary, all
people and all courts have looked upon that confidence between the party and attorney to be so
great, that it would be destructive to all business, if the attornies were to disclose the business of
their clients.... If an attorney had it in his option to be examined, there would be an entire stop
to business; nobody would trust an attorney with the state of his affairs. The reason why attornies
are not to be examined to any thing relating to their clients or their affairs is because they would
destroy the confidence that is necessary to be preserved between them." Annesley v. Earl of
Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1225 (1743); accord, Greenough v. Gaskell, 39 Eng. Rep. 618,
620-21 (Ch. 1833).
7. See, e.g., discussion of the abandonment of the Dead Man's Statute in Second Report of
Her Majesty's Commission for Inquiry into the Process, Practice and System of Pleading in
Superior Courts of Common Law (1853) and as detailed in Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F.
Supp. 1076, 1091-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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sure, 8 based largely on the concept that such privileges "foster socially
desirable confidences." 9 With this public policy in mind, a number of
commentators have stated that evidentiary privileges are themselves
"rights" entitled to full faith and credit or comity.10 The prevailing
views in the courts appear to agree, t I although the Supreme Court has
not spoken definitively on the subject. Nevertheless, the desirability
8. The most recently created "privilege" is the so-called "journalists' privilege" which is the
result of legislation during the past decade in a score of states. See, e.g.. Ala. Code tit. 7, § 370
(1960); Alaska Stat. § 09.25.150 (1973); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1974); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 43-917 (Repl. Vol. 1964); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West Supp. 1974); fI1. Ann. Stat. ch.
51, § 111 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-1733 (Burns 1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 421.100 (1972); La. Rev. Stat. § 45:1452 (Supp. 1974); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 2 (Repl. Vol.
1971); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-701-4 (Supp. 1974);
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.275 (1969); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1974); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1974); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2739.12 (Page 1954); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1974). Congress, however, has
never created such a privilege, and the United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize it in
the absence of such a legislative pronouncement. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90,
705-06 (1972). See also Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., Civil No. 74-635 (E.D.N.Y., filed
Feb. 24, 1975) (Weinstein, J.); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege
for Newsmen, 26 Hastings L.J. 709 (1975).
9. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of Another Jurisdiction, 56
Colum. L. Rev. 535, 536 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein]. There are, of course, other
philosophical bases for privileges, such as the protection of the individual's right of privacy.
Comment, The Privilege Doctrine and The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1173, 1182 (1973). The philosophical basis for the newsman's privilege is that "the interest
in dissemination outweighs an insubstantial state interest in the identity of the source . . . ." 82
Harv. L. Rev. 1384, 1386 (1969); see Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18, 44 (1969); Note, Reporters and Their
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 Yale L.J. 317, 329 (1970).
But all of these explanations, in essence, hark back to the philosophical conclusion that, for one
reason or another, the particular privilege is considered socially desirable.
10. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today.
31 Tul. L. Rev. 101, 117-24 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Louisell]; Comment, Evidentiaty
Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 640, 643 (1964). See also Weinstein 536-39,
541; Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 353 (1969). But cf. Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or
Procedural?, 10 Vand. L. Rev. 467 (1957). Thus, Professor David W. Louisell stated "The fact I
think is that the principal confidential communication privileges . . . are deeply rooted in our
political and social fabric, as they are in the mores and ethos of at least western society." Louisell
107-08.
11. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir.
1967); Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956);
Ranger, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 196 F.2d 968, 972 (6th Cir. 1952); Berdon v.
McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1953). But see Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14
F.R1D. 154, 156 (N.D. Ohio 1953). See also Ex Parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala.
1953).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
and appropriate scope of evidentiary privileges has long been debated,
with many distinguished advocates on record against them.12
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(and in particular rule 43(a)) in 1938, evidentiary privileges posed no
particular problem to the federal courts. 13 Generally, although the
reasoning sometimes varied slightly (e.g., between reliance on the
Conformity Act 14 or the Rules of Decision Act' 5 ), the federal courts
upheld the applicability of state privileges, without noticeable hesita-
tion. 16
It was only after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, or more accurately, the decisions in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins ' 7 and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 18 that the question of what effect state
privileges should have in federal litigation emerged as an inscrutable
and philosophically troublesome one for the federal courts. Basically,
the issue is whether rule 43(a), 19 which provides that federal courts
12. For example, Professor Wigmore, who was not a critic of privileges, stated in his oft-cited
treatise: "In general, then, the mere fact that a communication was made in express confidence,
or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege .... No pledge
of privacy nor oath of secrecy can avail against demand for the truth in a court of justice." 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2286, at 528 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). On the other hand, certain
privileges have been justified "as consistent with the goal of accurate fact-finding because they
help avoid perjury .... ." Louisell 109-10.
13. See, e.g., Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 Calif. L. Rev. 640
(1964). See .generally Callahan & Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 622, 632-34 (1936). But cf. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 569 (1930).
14. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197, repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 39, 62 Stat. 992. The act basically bound the federal courts to follow "the practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding" of the state courts in their district.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) directs the federal courts to treat "[t]he laws of the several states
. . . as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States."
16. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250, 254-55
(1884) (Rules of Decision Act rationale); American Ry. Express Co. v. Rowe, 14 F.2d 269, 270-71
(1st Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 743 (1927) (Rules of Decison Act rationale); cf. Butler v.
Fayerweather, 91 F. 458, 460 (2d Cir. 1899) (Rules of Decision Act rationale); Mutual Beneficial
Life Ins. Co. v. Robison, 58 F. 723, 731 (8th Cir. 1893) (Rules of Decision Act rationale). See also
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 458 (1876) (holding a state privilege
applicable by virtue of the Competency of Witnesses Act which had directed the federal courts to
look to their local state law in determining the competency of a witness to testify in a civil action).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Former Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black correctly described Erie
as "one of the most important cases at law in American legal history." Address by Mr. Justice
Black, 13 Mo. B.J. 173, 174 (1942).
18. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) provides in pertinent part: "All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court
1975] EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
shall follow the "statute or rule which favors the reception of the
evidence," creates an overriding federal policy that all evidence should
be admitted if any possible basis for admission exists, to the exclusion
of state law evidentiary privileges; or whether there is still room in
federal cases for state evidence concepts which exclude, rather than
admit, evidence. The matrix of post-Erie theorizing and the gradual
development of guideposts for the resolution of federal-state choice of
law conflicts20 has honed the matter into a sharp controversy.
Underlying the controversy is a philosophical debate, frequently not
recognized by the practicing bar and the courts, over what role the
federal courts must or should assume vis-a-vis state-created rights (and
vice versa). Professor Henry M. Hart of Harvard, the dean of theorists
on the subject, summarized the controversy as follows:
The complexities thus created [by the increasingly concurrent jurisdiction of state
and federal courts] are greatly enhanced by the circumstance, of enormous significance
in American federalism, that state courts are regularly employed for the enforcement
of federally-created rights having no necessary connection with state substantive law,
while federal courts are employed for the enforcement of state-created rights having no
necessary connection with federal substantive law. The states have no more conspicu-
ous role as agents of the nation than in the judicial enforcement of federal statutes.
And the federal courts, by virtue especially of the much-debated grant of jurisdiction
in controversies between citizens of different states, have a major responsibility to
enforce state law. In so enforcing substantive rights and duties created by the other
system, each of the two systems of courts employs its own rules of procedure and to
some extent its own remedial concepts. To the problems of disentangling federal
substantive law from state substantive law are thus added problems of disentangling
substantive law, state or federal as the case may be, from federal or state procedural
and remedial law.2'
This Article will not attempt to resolve this complex controversy. 22
is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the
evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the
statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be
determined in like manner."
20. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S 530 (1949); Byrd v Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer. 380 U.S 460 (1965); cf
Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications,
Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Massachusetts NMut. Life Ins,
Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1962).
21. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489. 498 (1954)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Hart].
22. For purposes of this Article, it will be assumed that Professor Charles Alan Wright's
observation regarding the effect of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), is correct:
"Thus there no longer is an Erie problem on matters covered by the Civil Rules. If the rule is
valid, and if it applies to the case, it is controlling, and no regard need be paid to contrary state
provisions.
"The Hanna case contributes needed clarity and simplicity of application to what had been a
very confused area of the law. It lightens the burden on the federal courts since they need not
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However, as will be seen below, the philosophical undercurrents about
which Professor Hart spoke have had a major effect on the lines of
decision seeking to define the viability of state-created privileges in the
federal courts.
For example, if, as suggested by Professor Charles Alan Wright
among others, 23 the bottom line of present decisional law on Erie is
that the federal courts must follow any Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure which may appear to touch the issue, regardless of the teachings
of state law, then the viability of evidentiary privileges may simply be
a question of interpretation and application of rule 43(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. But virtually no current scholar or court that
has confronted the problem appears willing to reduce the problem to
that simple a proposition. 24 Rather, the weight of authority seems to
insist that the court at least consult state public policy (as expressed
through judicial decision or legislative pronouncement) on the matter
of privilege. Such state policy should then be weighed against the
federal public policies in favor of uniformity of result (which the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a whole embody), admissibility of
all evidence (which rule 43(a) in particular appears to mandate) and
concern themselves with Erie problems if one of the rules is applicable. At the same time Hanna
creates an added burden on the Court and those who advise it in the rulemaking process. In
formulating a rule the rulemakers must now consider the extent to which application of a
proposed rule, in cases where state law is different, is consistent with the proper ordering of our
federal system." C. Wright, Federal Courts § 59, at 245 (2d ed. 1970). See also Wright,
Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 563, 571-74 (1967); Note,
Federal Rules of Privilege in Diversity Cases: A Time for Congressional Action, 8 Suffolk L. Rev.
1217, 1224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Suffolk Note].
23. See note 22 supra. See also Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 275 (1962).
24. One leading commentator has thus observed: "The argument that, Rule 43(a) being
equivalent to an Act of Congress within the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1952), it therefore provides a controlling federal evidence rule, however sound generally,
encounters in respect of the privileges the fact that substantive rights are not to be abridged,
enlarged or modified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1952)." Loulsell
121 n.91.
Compare Pugh, Rule 43(a) and the Communication Privileged Under State Law: An Analysis
of Confusion, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 556, 560-61 (1954) arguing by "negative implication that, unless
evidence is admissible under some one of the three systems referred to [in rule 43(a)], it should be
excluded by the federal court." See Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1091
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Neff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1948), aff'd, 173 F.2d 931
(3d Cir. 1949); Franzen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 51 F. Supp. 578, 584 (D.N.J. 1943),
aff'd, 146 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1944). Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 106 F.2d 618, 621 (8th Cir.
1939), did hold that rule 43(a) rendered the claimed doctor-patient privilege under Arkansas law
inapplicable in a diversity case, but that case appears outdated and superseded by more modern
authority to the contrary.
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any other substantive federal policies presented by the particular facts
of the case. 25
II. STATE PRIVILEGES IN DIVERSITY LITIGATION
Alexander Hamilton perceived the federal courts as the supreme
arbiters of all controversies "in which one State or its citizens are
opposed to another State or its citizens," so as to guarantee that all
citizens are assured of unbiased protection of their rights to all the
"privileges and immunities" created under state law. 26
In actual practice, as the Constitution was adopted and Congress
defined the matter of jurisdiction, the federal courts do not handle all
such controversies; rather, they handle only those based on the diver-
sity of citizenship of the litigants in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,00027 and which involve so-called "complete diversity"
(where no plaintiff and no defendant in the case are citizens of the
same state), 28 or those which are not initially brought in federal court
but which satisfy the somewhat arbitrary requirements for removal to
the federal court.2 9 Many controversies involving citizens of different
states either cannot be brought in federal court or simply are not
brought in federal court. As a result, some question exists as to the
proper role of the federal court sitting in a diversity case. Is it merely
to act "as an impartial forum in which state law can be enforced," 30 or
is it to serve as the diligent overseer of the "due administration of
25. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 778
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
26. Hamilton wrote:
"It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.' And if it be a just principle that
every government ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions, by its own
authority, it will follow that in order to [protect] the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another
State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and
subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which,
having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different States and their
citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias
inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded." The Federalist No. 80, at 44041 (Colonial
Press ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
28. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See also Salem Trust Co. v.
Manufacturers' Fin. Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. ITT
Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972); Fifty Associates v. Prudential Ins. Co., 446
F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1970).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
30. Weinstein 545.
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justice" to all citizens, affirmatively warding off state-created biases
which favor or discriminate against nonresidents?3 1 The former is the
prevailing view and was a cardinal aspect of the Erie decision.
The primary rationale usually offered for holding that the federal
courts in diversity cases must follow state law regarding evidentiary
privileges is that, in a diversity case, the federal court is dealing only
with state-created substantive rights. 32 The federal courts, the argu-
ment runs, should apply the same rules of law to those rights which
the state itself would apply, so as to deter litigants from forum-
shopping between the federal and state courts. 33 Where the state has
created the rights involved, it, and not the federal courts, should have
the ultimate say as to how those rights will be enforced or applied. 34
31. See, e.g., Hart 513-15.
32. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962);
Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 607-08 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956);
Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 467-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also R. & J. Dick Co. v.
Bass, 295 F. Supp. 758, 760-61 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90,
91 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Padovani v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.R.D. 255, 256 (E.D.N.Y.
1959); Car & Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein, 179 F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 277
F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam). But see Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15
F.R.D. 55, 57 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Ex Parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953);
Willard C. Beach Air Brush Co. v. General Motors Corp., 118 F. Supp. 242, 244 (D.N.J. 1953),
aff'd, 214 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1954) (per curiam). See generally Hope v. Hearst Consol.
Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Hambrice v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 290 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1961).
33. See, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 555 n.2 (2d Cir.
1967); Application of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Professor Charles Alan
Wright has aptly stated: "The state's effort to encourage these relationships [covered by
evidentiary privileges] will be hampered if the secrets of the marriage bed or the attorney's office
can be kept secret in state court but disclosed where, because of the accident of diversity, suit is
brought in federal court. Since the litigation is on a state-created right, there is no federal interest
that justifies such an interference with the state's decision that the relation is more important than
the litigation." C. Wright, Federal Courts § 93, at 415 (2d ed. 1970).
34. See C. Wright, Federal Courts § 93, at 412-15 (2d ed. 1970); accord, 2B W. Barron & A.
Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 967, at 243-44 (Wright ed. 1961) ("Privileges are created
in order to foster a relation which the state deems of such importance that it will encourage It
even at the price of excluding helpful testimony in litigation. Where the litigation involves rights
and duties which the state law creates, it is appropriate that the state, rather than the federal
court, should have the last word as to the comparative importance of the relation as against the
litigation. ').
The matter is hardly free of confusion. As the court recently stated in Courtland v. Walston &
Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dicta) (citation omitted): "The principles of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins .. .have not been held to extend to state exclusionary rules of
evidence in diversity cases. Erie did not deal with procedure or concern procedural matters as to
which Rule 43(a) applies. Consequently, in many instances, it becomes of importance to
determine whether competency of a witness is considered to involve substantive or procedural
law. If substantive, the Federal courts under the Erie rule, in diversity litigation, would be
required to apply state law, while if it is held a procedural matter, Federal courts must follow
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Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that privileges are "substan-
tive" rather than "procedural" in nature, and hence "affect private
conduct" and not merely the "processes of litigation. ' 3-
This view is not without its critics. For example, Professor Henry
Hart once scorned it as "[tihe triviality of this fear of forum-
shopping. '36 Nevertheless, it stands today as the prevailing view. But
the practicing lawyer cannot cease his analysis with the foregoing.
Many practical problems still must be confronted in each particular
case. Most obviously, the question remains whether, given the exis-
tence of an evidentiary privilege in the state, the party asserting it
actually satisfies the state's criteria for the privilege.
An interesting example is provided by Car & General Insurance
Corp. v. Goldstein,37 a diversity declaratory judgment action brought
by an insurer seeking to invalidate an insurance policy on the ground
that the insured had refused to cooperate in defending against an auto
accident claim involving the defendant's daughter. The defendant
sought to exclude all evidence of his conversations with his lawyer in
an earlier case involving that claim. Although the district court held
that it was bound by New York State's attorney-client privilege, it
nevertheless held the attorney's testimony admissible because, under
New York law, the lawyer had actually been representing both the
insurer and the insured. 38 Thus the insured's conversations with him
were not properly confidential as to the insurer. 39
Rule 43(a) and admit evidence admissible under any of the admission tests expressly set forth in
the statute. The distinction is not made without difficulty. Different Federal courts have reached
different conclusions. Not all the decisions, however, are based on a finding of either the
procedural or substantive nature of the state rule. Some of the decisions simply refer to Rule 43(a)
of the FRCP, while others fail to state a basis upon which they reached the result.-
35. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463, 466 (2d Cir. 1962) and other
cases cited in notes 32-33 supra. But cf. Suffolk Note, supra note 22. at 1219. This analysis
(i.e., based on the state's creation of the underlying rights in the litigation), while satisfactory for
diversity cases, is fraught with complications in federal question cases, especially where "state"
issues are being tried simultaneously under the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court. As
shown below (see notes 132-37 infra and accompanying text) the Congress, especially its Judiciary
Committees, in seeking to disentangle the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, has found this
analysis particularly difficult to apply on an across-the-board basis to all evidentiary privileges.
36. Hart 513.
37. 179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 890-91; see, e.g., Shafer v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 N.Y.S.
577 (4th Dep't 1936).
39. The court stated. "Wigmore points out that when an attorney acts for two parties having
a common interest, communications by the parties to the attorney are not privileged in a
controversy between these same two parties because the common interest forbade concealment by
either from the other. 8 Wigraore § 2312 p. 603 (3d ed.). Here the insurance company and insured
have a common interest in the defense of suits against the insured. Not only was the defendant's
statement to Mr. Cornella not privileged from disclosure to the insurance company, it was, in
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More challenging problems arise when an evidentiary privilege is
claimed in pretrial discovery, especially where discovery is sought
under a subpoena of a federal court sitting in a state other than the
trial state. 40 Where a deposition of a non-party witness is involved,
rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
application to compel disclosure or for sanctions against the witness
must be made to the federal court in the district where the refusal to
answer occurred. 4 1 Which state's law (i.e., the deposition state or the
trial state) should apply? And, where the two conflict, what policy
interest (i.e., the witness's right to the protections of his home state or
fact, defendant's duty, imposed by his contract, to make a fair and frank disclosure to the
insurance company because of their common interest in knowing the way in which the accident
happened." 179 F. Supp. at 891. Thus, while the statement involved may have been "privileged"
in an action between the insured and a third party, it was not privileged in the insurer's action
against the insured. See Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509, 512 (N.D. I11. 1972)
(mem.) (reaching a similar result with regard to the Illinois accountant-client privilege).
In Bethel v. Thornbrough, 311 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1962), the court held that the plaintiffs had
waived their right to claim Colorado doctor-patient privilege in a diversity action involving an
auto collision since they had requested a copy of the doctor's report and Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2)
expressly declares such a request a waiver of any privilege involved. The court concluded that it
need not pass on the applicability of the state statute since a federal procedural rule rendered it
nugatory in the case at hand. 311 F.2d at 204.
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) expressly limits pretrial discovery in federal civil cases to matters
"not privileged." The United States Supreme Court has ruled that this language refers to
evidentiary privileges. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953) (based on prior rule 34; the
discovery rules were amended and largely reorganized and renumbered in 1970). See also
Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 623 (N.D. Iowa), appeal dismissed, 323 F.2d 716 (8th
Cir. 1963). But see Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958); Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632, 636 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (holding that
matters merely deemed by the deponent to be confidential but not covered by a statutory privilege
do not fall within the limitation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)).
On the other hand, compare Reed v. Smith, Barney & Co., 50 F.R.D. 128, 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (mem.); National Util. Serv., Inc. v. Wisconsin Centrifugal Foundry, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 539
(E.D. Wis. 1968); DeLong Corp. v. Lucas, 138 F. Supp. 805, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Kaufman,
J.); Shawmut, Inc. v. American Viscose Corp., 11 F.R.D. 562, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (all
recognizing, as a matter of discretion, a witness's right to limit disclosure to matters deemed not
confidential).
41. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) provides: "An application for an order to a party may be made to
the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in
the district where the deposition is being taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is
not a party shall be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken."
Interestingly, in such a situation, the order of the court is appealable immediately, not-
withstanding 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970) (interlocutory decisions). Otherwise the party seeking
disclosure might have no effective remedy, since to return to the deposition jurisdiction after trial
for a separate appeal would be cumbersome at best. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d
778, 780 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Honig v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 404
F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); National Nut Co. v. Kelling Nut Co., 134 F.2d 532, 533
(7th Cir. 1943) (per curiam).
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
the substantive law of the other state which governs the merits) should
predominate? Numerous corollary situations can be envisioned: For
example, what is the applicable law where the law of State X is the
governing law on the merits of a diversity claim between citizens of
State X and State Y in the federal court in State Y, but the testimony
involved is that of a citizen of State Z, taken in his home state or even
some other state?
Some of these situations already have been litigated, with the results
generally turning on the choice of law rule which the federal court
believes the state courts in its district would apply.42 A few examples
are appropriately illustrative.
Palmer v. Fisher43 was a diversity suit pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida in which one of the
issues concerned the accuracy of the financial reports and records of
Black Ranches, Inc. The defendant took a pretrial deposition in
Illinois of one of the accountants who had audited the books of Black
Ranches. At the deposition the accountant refused to answer certain
questions, invoking the Illinois statutory privilege attaching to
accountant-client communications. 44 The defendant moved to compel
a response on the grounds that there is no federally created privilege
for accountants45 and that, in any event, Florida law (which also had
no such privilege) governed since Florida was the trial forum of the
case. The Seventh Circuit held for the accountant in an opinion Which
announced outright that (a) "[s]ince the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal
courts have felt bound to follow the rules of evidence of the state in
which they sat, except where inconsistent with federal constitutional or
statutory provisions" 46 and (b) "since the proceeding to suppress a
deposition is an independent action, the law of the forum is the law of
Illinois. ''47 The decision also contained strong anti-forum shopping
overtones. 4
8
42. This result follows the principle established in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mlfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941); see Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1956);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also Cook, The
Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 Ill. L. Rev. 493 (1942); Currie, Change of Venue and
the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 341 (1960).
43. 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956).
44. IMI. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 , § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
45. For cases so holding see United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 481 (7th Cir. 1968),
vacated and remanded, 395 U.S. 710 (1969); Himmelfarb v. United States. 175 F.2d 924, 939
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); United States v. Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419, 433-34
(D. Md. 1963).
46. 228 F.2d at 608.
47. Id. at 608-09.
48. Thus Judge Swaim reasoned: "The next question is the applicability of an Illinois
statutory privilege to a deposition taken in Illinois for use in Florida. We are unable to find direct
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In Application of Cepeda,4 9 a libel action by baseball star Orlando
Cepeda against the publisher of Look Magazine which was pending in
the California federal courts, a magazine writer deposed in New York
sought to invoke California's journalist privilege in refusing to answer
questions. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York ruled that the law of the trial state (which had a privilege
statute) prevailed over the law of the deposition state (which had no
such provision), on the theory that the trial state had a more clearly
defined and enunciated public policy. 50 In dictum, the court further
authority on the point, but conclude that an Illinois court (or a federal court sitting in Illinois)
could properly enforce this Illinois statutory privilege no matter where the deposition is to be
used. The State Legislature had declared it to be public policy in Illinois that public accountants
shall not be required to testify about information obtained in their confidential capacity as
accountants. This policy would be defeated if any court, state or federal, sitting in Illinois should
require an accountant to testify as to such information. This would be true whether the testimony
was to be used in a court sitting in Illinois or in any other state." Id. at 608. But see Ex Parte
Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953), where, in a libel action pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, a United States District Judge in Alabama
upheld the right of a reporter at his Alabama deposition to refuse to answer questions regarding
his source of information for the magazine article involved (an expos6 of prison conditions) on the
basis of an Alabama privilege statute (Ala. Code tit. 7, § 370 (1958)), even though New York then
had no such statute (New York now has a statute immunizing newsmen from contempt. N.Y.
Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1974)). The Alabama federal court rejected any notion
that it was required to apply state evidentiary law but elected to follow it nevertheless so as to
uphold the witness's reliance on the Alabama state privilege: "This court is not bound to apply
the Alabama law [i.e., an Alabama statute giving journalists a privilege to refuse to reveal their
sources] in interpreting the words 'not privileged' as they appear in rule 26 (b) [Fed. R. Civ. P.].
But it would not be justified in ignoring such a clear and unequivocal pronouncement of the
public policy of the state in which it sits ....... 14 F.R.D. at 353.
Following more traditional Klaxon doctrine and state choice of law concepts, the Eighth
Circuit recently reached the opposite conclusion in Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 989
n.5 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). There, the Mayor of St. Louis was suing
Life Magazine and one of its reporters in the federal court in Missouri, alleging libel based on an
article which claimed he had associations with organized crime. The Mayor deposed the New
York reporter in New York, who claimed the protections of that state's journalists' shield law
(which as noted above, had been enacted since the Sparrow case) in refusing to reveal his source
information. The Mayor then moved for a contempt order in the federal court in the trial state,
rather than in the deposition state-a procedure which would not have been available if the
reporter were merely a witness and not a party defendant (cf. note 41 supra). The court of
appeals, applying the Missouri state choice of law rule that "the admissibility of evidence Is
governed by the law of the State where the testimony is to be heard," determined that the public
policy of the deposition state was irrelevant and "entitled [the reporter] to no protection on that
ground." 464 F.2d at 989 n.5. In view of the fact that the reporter was a New York citizen who
had written the article there, in claimed reliance on the New York statute, this is a harsh
statement to say the least. The only apparent justification for it is that Cervantes was a libel case,
not a case involving a clearly "innocent" reporter witness. Cf. Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d
778, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
49. 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
50. Id. at 470-71. The court, however, then went on to decide that the witness failed to
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observed that "if the situation were reversed," so that there was a
stronger public policy regarding the privilege in the deposition state
than in the trial state, it would have deferred to the policy of the
deposition state.5 ' Since, if a state makes a statement regarding a
privilege at all, it is far more likely to do so in favor of the privilege-
states usually pass statutes only to create privileges, not to record their
decision not to create a privilege-the reasoning of the Cepeda court
would appear to suggest that whenever either the deposition or the
trial state recognizes a privilege, the federal court should do so also. 52
A similar conclusion is suggested by R. & J. Dick Co. v. Bass, 5 3 a
diversity action in a Georgia federal court, in which the plaintiff
corporation claimed that the defendant, a former director and officer,
had surreptitiously misappropriated its rights to a valuable distributor-
ship contract immediately prior to leaving the plaintiffs employ. To
prove its case, the plaintiff sought to depose the defendant's former
wife, a resident of Pennsylvania, in Pennsylvania, notwithstanding a
Pennsylvania statute5 4 absolutely prohibiting spouses from testifying
against each other in civil cases. Georgia law contained no such
provision, but did contain a qualified and limited spousal privilege. -5
In spite of its conclusion that, technically, Georgia law applied and the
fact that Georgia had made a public policy pronouncement (through its
own statute) on the issue involved, the court resolved to decide
whether the deposition should go forward under Pennsylvania law,
since that state's public policy appeared to be the more dominant.
5 6
satisfy the requirements of the California privilege statute and, thus, compelled disclosure of the
information sought. Id. at 473.
51. Id. at 470.
52. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
stands as contrary authority to this proposition, and it may be the state courts which supply a
strong negative public policy statement. See note 48 supra. Moreover, it is possible to read
Cepeda as merely stating the same result which a New York state court would apply under New
York choice of law rules.
Nevertheless, the following reasoning is persuasive and appears appropriate (in the absence of
either an overriding federal policy or manifest injustice on the facts presented): 'lUInless a state
has no substantial interests in the issue in question, which is not the case with privileges, it ill
becomes a federal court to say that the state's legislature and judiciary are less interested than
itself in promoting the ends of justice.... Where a state legislature has enacted a privilege, and
the main thrust of litigation concerns state created rights and obligations, federal courts should
defer to the state." Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts, 52 Calif. L. Rev.
640, 648 (1964). But see, e.g., Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 n.2
(2d Cir. 1967) (where the court expressly left open the choice of law issue for future decision).
53. 295 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
54. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, §§ 316-17 (Purdon 1958).
55. Ga. Code Ann. § 38-418 (1974).
56. 295 F. Supp. at 761-62. It should be noted, however, that the court also held that, in any
event, Georgia choice of law principles would have required deference to Pennsylvania's statute.
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The court, however, then went on to decide that, even under Pennsyl-
vania law, notwithstanding the statutory privilege, the deposition
could proceed subject to specific objections and limitations to be raised
if and as the deposition proceeded into confidential areas.
In sum, in diversity cases, strong authority exists for the proposition
that state evidentiary privileges should be recognized and deferred to
in the absence of either extremely unusual circumstances or clear
injustice. Where the interests of more than one state are involved (such
as where a deposition is conducted under subpoena from a federal
court in one state for use at trial in a federal court in another state) the
courts should utilize a "center of gravity" approach, similar to that
used in traditional state conflicts of law doctrine, to determine which
state's law regarding the privilege should be followed. This approach
is recommended in all such cases, even though it may depart in some
instances from the general rule that a federal court in a diversity case
should follow the conflicts of law rules of the state in which it sits. The
federal courts should maintain a uniform approach, although not
necessarily uniform decisions, as to the treatment of claims of privilege
based on state law in diversity cases. While, to a very limited extent,
such an approach may encourage forum shopping, it should insure
more just results in more cases, which would appear to outweigh any
possible harm from such forum shopping. Moreover, in determining
whether or not to defer to the claimed privilege in a particular case,
the court may consider whether it feels that forum shopping has
improperly been a factor in the assertion of the privilege.
Where both states involved have the same public policy, no choice is
necessary. But where one state recognizes the privilege and the other
does not (as frequently occurs in the case of the journalist's privilege or
the accountant-client privilege), the federal court reviewing the claim
of privilege should carefully weigh which state, on the facts presented,
is most interested in the claim of privilege and, in general, defer to the
law of that state. For example, in the case of a non-party witness
deposed in State A (his home state) with regard to a diversity case
pending in State B between citizens of States A and B, where the
conduct in question took place in State A, State A would appear to
have a more direct and substantial interest in litigation. On the other
hand, if State B has an overriding public policy on the question of the
privilege involved, a federal court may determine that justice requires
Id. at 761; see Lowe's of Roanoke, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 181,
188-89 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (an order that a doctor answer certain deposition questions con-
formed with North Carolina law and thus was "in conformity with the clearly established attitude
of the forum where the issue of the admissibility of confidential communications made to the
physician will ultimately be in issue.').
[Vol. 43
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deference to that policy. But such deference to the public policy of the
less interested state should be a matter of exception, not the rule.
IV. STATE PRIVILEGES IN FEDERAL QUESTION
LITIGATION
Where Congress has declared a substantive federal policy by enact-
ing specific legislation on a topic, the weight of authority holds that the
federal courts should resolve questions of privilege under federal, not
state law.5 7 On the other hand, several of these cases specifically hold
that, in fashioning federal common law on the subject, the federal
courts may consider and adopt state law where "substantial state
interests" are involved. 58 Thus several reported federal question cases
have recognized a witness's right to assert an evidentiary privilege
based upon a state privilege statute. 59
57. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971) (attorney-client privilege in federal securities case); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) (attorney-client privilege in federal
tax investigation); In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953). tert.
denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954) (physician-patient privilege in federal tax investigation); Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) (accountant-client
privilege in federal tax investigation); United States v. Brunner, 200 F.?d 276 (6th Cir 1952)
(spousal privilege asserted in action under federal statute permitting recovery for wrongful
criminal conviction); Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied. 324 U.S.
849 (1945) (spousal privilege in action under Agricultural Adjustment Act); Courtland v. Walston
& Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1088-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Dead Man's Statute in federal securities
action); United States v. Troupe, 317 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Mo. 1970). aff'd, 438 F.2d 317 (8th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (privilege against self incrimination in federal tax case); United States v.
Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Mo. 1969) (physician-
patient privilege in federal tax case); Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp 905 (N.D, Ill. 1963)
(accountant-client privilege in federal tax proceedings). In bankruptcy cases the spousal privilege
has been largely legislated out of existence. Bankruptcy Act § 2 1(a), 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1970).
58. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971) ("This is a federal question case (with ancillary state aspects) rather than a
diversity case. Such actions are predicated on federal law, embodying federal policies. Enforce-
ment of those policies demands that the federal courts apply their own rules of privilege where
substantial state interests are not infringed.").
59. See, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney-client privilege
in federal tax litigation); Baker v. F & F Inv., 339 F. Supp. 942, 944 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 470 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (journalists' privilege in action under federal
Civil Rights Act); Kott v. Perini, 283 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (mem.) (governmental
privilege in habeas corpus proceeding); Giordani v. Hoffman, 278 F. Supp. 886, 889 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (attorney-client privilege asserted in action under Labor-Management Relations Act); Malco
Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 45 F.R.D. 24, 26 (D. Minn. 1968) (attorney-client privilege for "house
counsel" in patent litigation); United States v. Ladner, 238 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Miss. 1965)
(attorney-client privilege in federal tax proceeding); Spray Prod. Corp. v. Strouse, Inc., 31
F.RD. 244, 246-47 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (attorney-client privilege in patent litigation); United States
v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925, 926-27 (E.D. Ky. 1962) (attorney-client privilege in federal tax
proceedings); Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp. 430, 433 (N.D. Ohio
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A split of authority also exists as to whether federal government
administrative agencies must recognize state created privileges in
connection with their subpoenas and other investigative activities.
60
Commentators are likewise divided as to what, if any, rule should
prevail regarding the availability of state evidentiary privileges in civil
federal question cases. 6 1
These conflicting views and decisions cannot be readily reconciled,
1962) (physician-patient privilege in action under the Jones Act); United States v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 212 F. Supp. 92, 94-95 (D.N.J. 1962) (attorney-client privilege in antitrust
case); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (attorney-
client privilege in antitrust case); Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22, 44-45 (N.D. Iowa
1948) (doctor-patient privilege in suit under Federal Tort Claims Act). But it is interesting to note
that while a significant number of these cases upheld the principle that state privileges were
available, they also held the privilege to be inapplicable on the facts presented. That situation
was also true in many diversity cases, as noted earlier.
60. Compare Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963), with Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); see FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304
F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962) (accountant-client privilege need not be accepted); McMann v. SEC, 87
F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) (duty to disclose in court all pertinent
information within one's control held paramount to duty of fiduciary not to betray his customer);
CAB v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 201 F. Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorney-client privilege
accepted); Gretsky v. Basso, 136 F. Supp. 640, 641 (D. Mass. 1955) (physician-patient privilege
rejected before IRS); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1948), rehearing denied, 184
F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1950), vacated and remanded as moot, 340 U.S. 908 (1951) (attorney-client
privilege upheld); Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 61, 112-13 n.213 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Krattenmaker]; Comment, Privileged Communications Before Federal Administrative Agencies:
The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 395 (1964). See also Fahey,
Testimonial Privilege of Accountants in Federal Tax Fraud Investigations, 17 Tax L. Rev. 491
(1962).
61. For example, compare Louisell, supra note 10 at 121 ("the reasons ... for abiding the
state privileges are a fortiori applicable to federal question litigation.'), with Rothstein, The
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 125, 130 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Rothstein] ("Having a clear and easily located body of [federal] law [regarding
privileges] for uniform use in all federal courts is necessary if evidentiary questions in the
hurly-burly of daily litigation are to be handled soundly, expeditiously, and without protracted
appeals.') and Krattenmaker 113 n.213 ("the most that can be said is that federal courts seem to
have the power to disregard state privileges in federal civil cases and that there is presently no set
pattern as to whether and when they will exercise that power). As will be shown further (Part V
infra), the debate has continued heatedly and unresolved as the Federal Rules of Evidence have
wended their way through the United States Supreme Court and both Houses of Congress. See
also notes 119 & 124 infra, further detailing the debate over federal uniformity as it relates to the
whole concept of having a uniform set of federal evidentiary rules. Compare Pugh, supra note 24,
at 566-68 (arguing that "normally it is desirable for federal courts to honor and apply state
privileges" but that such is a matter of comity only, to be decided on the individual facts present
and "not of compulsion"), with Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules,
55 Harv. L. Rev. 197, 208-09 (1941) (arguing that state law should be considered only where it
favors admissibility regardless of a claim of privilege).
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and no simple rule has yet emerged from the cases. 62 Judge Jack
B. Weinstein provided what appears to be the most rational synthesis,
and the most prudent one for the courts to follow:
Where the federal courts are enforcing a national substantive policy, they cannot be
bound by state privileges. . . .The problem is complex, however, because non-
diversity cases range from those where an all-embracing federal substantive law is
applied to situations where . . . the federal courts are explicitly enforcing state tort
law. As the spectrum shifts from over-riding federal to over-riding state policy, we can
expect the rule on recognition of state privilege to shift.
63
The proper task for a court, therefore, is to analyze the purpose and
force of the particular federal interest involved and balance it against
the rationale and comparative strength underlying the particular state
evidentiary privilege so as to determine which, in the interest of
ultimate justice on the particular facts presented, should predomi-
nate. 64 Complicating this task somewhat are the additional federal
62. Some of the different results reflected by the cases are explainable on the basis of factual
distinctions, but others, like Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963), and Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). are squarely at
loggerheads and cannot be reconciled by mere factual distinctions-they represent different basic
theoretical approaches to the problem. Indeed, many learned commentators have simply thrown
up their hands and acknowledged that the federal decisions are not consistent and that no single
rule has as yet emerged. See, e.g., C. Wright, Federal Courts § 93, at 414 (2d ed. 1970) (-The
situation in private federal question cases is quite unclear."); Krattenmaker. supra note 60, at 112
n.213 ("perhaps nothing is more confused and confusing than the case law bearing on the issue of
when federal courts will defer to state privileges in civil cases where federal law supplies the rule
of decision on the underlying merits.").
63. Weinstein, supra note 9, at 547 (footnote omitted). This type of flexible approach was
substantially accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), where the court stated, although holding that the
attorney-client privilege should not be recognized in the situation there presented-
"This is not to say that state interests play no part. Our discussion below points up that many
of the factors to be weighed in the consideration of federal and state interests are predicated on
values long embodied in policies of the states rather than federal law. And it goes without saying
that a federal court must take full account of the reasons for any asserted privilege including any
especially strong policies of the state in which the court sits. But it must take account of federal
interests as well." Id. at 1100 (footnote omitted). The court aptly called these factors -[the
competing interests in disclosure on the one hand and confidentiality on the other. .... " Id.
64. There are, of course, many critics of such a case-by-case approach. For example, one
commentator remarked: "To adopt a case by case approach evaluating state privileges in the light
of a federal program would inevitably confront the courts with the problem of establishing a
policy basis for distinguishing between the virtues of an attorney-client privilege and those, for
example, of an accountant-client privilege." Comment, Privileged Communications Before Fed-
eral Administrative Agencies: The Law Applied in the District Courts, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 395,
414 (1964).
Likewise, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), Mr. Justice White emphasized as one of
the reasons for rejecting a qualified journalists' privilege, although many state legislatures had
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policy interests of uniformity of decision among the federal courts,
especially in construing a particular federal right, 65 and the apparent
federal policy underlying rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in favor of the admissibility of all evidence in federal civil
cases. 66 These latter two federal interests, albeit deserving of consider-
ation in the court's analysis, would generally appear, however, to be
secondary in importance to the other more substantive policy consider-
ations to be analyzed: to wit, those underlying the particular federal
substantive right and the particular state evidentiary privilege in-
volved. 6 7
created one, that such would enmesh the courts in the time-consuming and complicated task of
reviewing the factual context of virtually every instance where a journalist felt he was privileged
not co respond. Id. at 704. This view appears to give too little consideration to the valid and often
strong policies which underlie state evidentiary privileges. Especially if one agrees that such
privileges embody substantive rights for the state's citizenry, those public policies would appear
to merit more serious consideration than to be brushed aside merely because some added judicial
effort may be required or because some divergent results (based on factual distinctions) may occur
in different cases.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home and Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp.
239, 243 (W.D. Mo. 1969) ("It seems clear to us that the policy considerations and the desirability
of avoiding inconsistent treatment to federal taxpayers command a uniform federal common law
rule in regard to Internal Revenue Service investigations authorized by federal law.").
This type of reasoning is not confined to privilege or evidentiary cases. Other cases have held,
in different contexts, that the interest of uniformity in federal decisions under certain federal
legislation demands that federal common law be decreed and state law rejected outright (or, at
best, if not contrary to the policy of the federal statute, borrowed and redesignated as federal
common law in construing the statute). See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 457 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). See also
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34 (1956); Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1955).
But cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). But this rule does not necessarily apply In
every instance; rather only where an overriding federal public concern clearly is involved.
66. See, e.g., Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1972): "While
the issue may not be free from doubt, there are certainly strong policy reasons to desire a
uniformity of disposition of cases involving a purely federal right granted solely by act of
Congress, and which would not exist at all at common law or in the absence of the federal
statute. It is unconscionable to assume that, contrary to the clear literal mandate of Rule 43(a), a
state statute relating to competency of witnesses could operate so as to give a different result to
litigants asserting a federal right in this District, than would be enjoyed in any of the other states
which have no dead man's statute at all, or where there are slightly different shades of meaning
and interpretation attached to any such exclusionary rule which may exist."
67. The policy interests here emphasized are by no means exclusive. Others have been
suggested for general consideration, and still others may become apparent in the context of the
individual case. For example, one commentator who has agreed that an "interest analysis"
approach is desirable in federal question litigation, has suggested these four criteria: "(I) whether
the policy underlying a federal statutory scheme requires uniformity of law on the issue in
question; (2) whether state interests in the issue outweigh those of the federal government; (3)
whether conduct at the primary level of activity was done in reliance on state or federal law; (4)
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Of course, critics of this approach exist. Their view is primarily that
the interests of full disclosure and truth outweigh any possible interest
in favor of the privilege. 68 This view obviously, but provincially,
rejects the notion that evidentiary privileges themselves represent a
meaningful policy interest which must be balanced against and may
predominate over the interest of disclosure. The reliance fostered
among the state's citizenry is enough in itself to justify serious consid-
eration of, although not automatic deference to, any assertion of
privilege. The general public and, for that matter, many in the legal
profession are unaware that a different rule may exist in federal
question litigation. Unless a serious federal interest is at stake, one
who has made confidential disclosures in reliance on his home state's
privileges should not be "entrapped" into disclosure of those confi-
dences and thus penalized for the reliance his state's law has fostered,
merely because he finds himself in a federal court. The courts should
recognize that, implicit in the assertion of a privilege, is an important
issue of what constitutes fair governmental treatment of the individual
and his right of privacy, particularly in private civil litigation, since
there appears to be no empirical evidence to support the thesis that
privileges tend to foster fraud or injustice. 69 Mere common sense
reasoning would appear to suggest that, in view of the broad panoply
of factual situations which the federal courts confront, such generaliza-
tions, pro and con, regarding the innate justice of a claim of eviden-
tiary privilege are not capable of either proof or complete accuracy;
whether, from a practical viewpoint, it is more convenient for a federal court to apply state or
federal law." Comment, Evidentiary Privileges in the Federal Courts. 52 Calif. L Rev. 640,
650-51 (1964). It would appear, however, that the first two criteria represent the predominant
policy interests. Factors such as the practical convenience in applying federal or state law, while
of value, should be limited to secondary consideration.
68. See notes 64 supra & 123 infra. Professor Richard Degnan wrote: -ilt seems hard to
dispute that the doctor-patient privilege operates primarily as an instrument of fraud, in the sense
that it is employed to suppress matter not in any way disgraceful or embarrassing to the patient
but which would, if revealed, defeat dishonest claims or defenses. Only a wrong-headed system
would retain a rule which does so much demonstrable harm to achieve so little conjectural good.
But fraud is only a matter of definition. As shown above, it is no affront to state policy to reach a
closer approach to truth than a state feels its processes can attain, but it is a substantial affront to
strive for a juster justice than the state wishes to provide. That is permissible when the object is
to serve an overriding federal interest, a furtherance of federal policy." Degnan, The Law of
Federal Evidence Reform, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 275, 300 (1962) (footnote omitted).
69. Professor David Louisell, who was admittedly as predisposed in favor of state privileges
as Professor Degnan was apparently opposed to them, wrote in his seminal article on the matter
"[I]t would be doubtful that the general federal objective of accurate adjudication in federal
litigation would per se justify undermining the state recognized privileges, since history seems to
attest that the privileges are not so inimical to accurate adjudication as to be an unreasonable
burden." Louisell, supra note 10, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
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hence, a weighing-of-interests analysis appears to offer the "rule" most
likely to achieve justice in the most instances. Here again, a few cases
may help to illustrate the problem as it arises in the courts.
United States v. Becton Dickinson & Co. 70 presents perhaps an
extreme example of the recognition of state privileges in federal
question cases. Becton was a government civil antitrust suit in which
the government sought to subpoena corporate records which the
defendant claimed were privileged. The government argued that no
privilege was available because a corporation does not have the right
to claim the protections of the attorney-client privilege. 7 ' Apparently
neither side thought to argue whether, in view of the strong federal
policies underlying the antitrust laws, 72 state privileges were unavaila-
ble anyway. 73 The court reviewed the matter and concluded that it
was basically one of construction of rules 34 and 43 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Although rule 43(a) specifically states that
the law which "favors the reception of the evidence governs, '7 4 the
court upheld the claim of privilege on the ground that the New Jersey
statute75 expressed an overriding public policy contrary to reception of
the evidence in question. The court concluded that it should not deny
to the defendant the protection of that state policy in the absence
of a statute or rule specifically "authorizing the disregard of the
privilege."
76
70. 212 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).
71. The government relied upon two opinions in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. IIl. 1962), and 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d
314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), both of which turned on the fact that tile
corporation's right to assert the claimed privilege (attorney-client) was based solely upon common
law, rather than a specific statute in Illinois. Such appears to be a distinction without actual or
persuasive merit. A privilege is no less an expression of state public policy because the state
judiciary creates it than it would be if the state legislature created it. The relevant inquiry rather
should be how strong the state public policy is, particularly when viewed in the light of the other
competing public policies involved.
72. The federal public policy in favor of vigorous antitrust enforcement is among the
strongest federal public policies underlying federal question litigation. For example, it has been
deemed so strong that, in a private action, the defendant may not raise an in pari delicto defense
against a plaintiff-participant in the antitrust violation involved. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340
U.S. 211 (1951).
73. However, other private antitrust actions had already permitted claims of privilege based
on state law. See, e.g., Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). Perhaps the litigants in Becton were aware of and merely accepted that authority.
74. See note 19 supra.
75. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-20 (Supp. 1974).
76. 212 F. Supp. at 95. Judge Wortendyke stated: "It would be very strange indeed were this
Federal Court to deprive a litigant before it of the protection afforded by the State statute. Since
the Legislature in this State has spoken, there is no 'statute or rule' authorizing the disregard of
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Courtland v. Walston & Co., 7 7 an action based on the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws, leans toward the other ex-
treme. The court emphasized that, in a case based on a federal statute,
"[i]t is unconscionable to assume that, contrary to the clear literal
mandate of Rule 43(a), a state statute ... could operate so as to give a
different result. .." in one federal jurisdiction (i.e., whose forum state
recognizes the privilege) than might occur in another federal jurisdic-
tion (i.e., where the forum state had no such privilege). 78 The court in
Courtland was undoubtedly swayed by the fact that, unless the
evidentiary privilege (there, based on the Dead Man's Statute) was
overruled, the plaintiff would have no other means of proving the
substance of her discussions with the allegedly fraudulent securities
salesman. 79 The court, however, apparently felt compelled to go to
great lengths to justify its holding, and reviewed the history of the
Dead Man's Statute in England and America and the conflicting views
and considerations posed by the whole question of the applicability of
state privileges to federal litigation.80 In that sense, the court, whether
intentionally or inadvertently, followed the type of analysis recom-
mended here, and its conclusion may properly be deemed limited to
the privilege. On the contrary, Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, without which
the plaintiff would be disentitled to inspection or copying of documents, expressly provides that
only documents which are not privileged may be subjected to that form of discovery. In sum, the
New Jersey Legislature has set at rest any doubt respecting the persistence of the attorney-client
privilege, and its availability to a corporate litigant in this State. Since the privilege exists in
favor of the defendant corporation under the New Jersey statute, the documents which the
plaintiff seeks to examine are protected not only by the provisions of Rule 34, but by those of
Rule 43(a) as well." Id.
77. 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
78. Id. at 1091; see note 66 supra.
79. Many cases have emphasized that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
embody a strong federal public policy favoring protection of and full disclosure to investors.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974).
It is interesting to note, however, that on other substantive issues which have arLen under the
federal securities laws, the courts have considered and given great weight to state law See, e.g..
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y 1970), aff'd, 442
F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971) (upholding the right of defendant to seek
contribution from his co-defendants in rule 10b-5 action).
80. 340 F. Supp. at 1085-92. Others insist that the Dead Man's Statute is solely a matter of
competency of witnesses, not privilege, thus reviving the spectre of continued confusion over
whether the modern version of the Erie doctrine does or does not apply to such matters. In an)'
event, Judge Brieant viewed the question as one not only of competence but also of privilege;
moreover, the treatment of issues relating to the competency of witnesses, at least insofar as the
Dead Man's Statute is concerned, parallels that of state evidentiary privileges, so that Courtland
appears to be an appropriate example to discuss here. See note 123 infra-
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the facts brought before it--or, at most, to the applicability of the
Dead Man's Statute.
Another interesting aspect of the Courtland decision is the court's
avoidance of the fact that the case was being brought not only under
federal law but also, by virtue of the principle of pendent jurisdiction,
under the New York Blue Sky Law. 8' Thus, at least to some extent,
state-created rights were also involved and were directly affected by
the court's decision to ignore the state evidentiary privilege asserted.
On the facts of the case, it is difficult to quarrel with the result, and it
may be that the federal public policy underlying the federal securities
laws simply outweighed the state interests in Courtland. However, in
the many other situations where federal and state rights are simulta-
neously litigated, it may be appropriate and even necessary for the court
to weigh carefully the effect of its rulings on the state aspect of the
case. This is not to suggest that the court should make two different
rulings on the same point (i.e., one regarding the federal claim and the
other for the state claim), although such a situation could occur in an
exceptional case (such as where the state claim is being tried before a
jury and the federal claim is non-jury and the evidence on it heard out
of the presence of the jury). But the existence of pendent state claims
does present an additional policy consideration for the court to weigh
in its balancing test.
More closely representative of the view here espoused is Mariner v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 8 2 a Jones Act case where the court
concluded that it "should recognize the basic privilege of state statute,
while retaining a free hand with which to define its scope and draw its
limitations. '83 However, the Jones Act does not appear to represent a
strong federal substantive policy similar to that embodied by the
federal securities, antitrust or labor laws, and thus the force of the
decision in Mariner could be questioned in a case involving a more
overriding federal policy.84 This is not to say that Mariner is wrong or
81. Blue Sky Law § 1, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352 (McKinney 1968); 340 F. Supp. at 1078
82. 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
83. Id. at 433 (the defendant had moved for production of certain hospital and medical
records, to which the plaintiff objected on the basis of the state's physician-patient privilege).
84. Judge Weinstein raised this same point with regard to cases under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (1970), which (like the Jones Act) essentially creates
state-type negligence litigative rights for specific federal situations rather than establishing a
federal substantive law to regulate an industry or type of conduct in interstate commerce. See
Weinstein, supra note 9, at 547. The fact that the Jones Act confers concurrent jurisdiction on the
state courts (46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)) may in itself be a factor to be considered in favor of giving
special weight to state law in Jones Act cases.
Admiralty cases (as to which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)), are now subject to the same federal rules of
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that it is not generally applicable to other federal question cases, but
rather to observe that it may not be conclusive authority for all federal
question cases.
The applicability of the balancing approach to disputes arising in
connection with a deposition being conducted in a state other than the
trial forum is well illustrated in Baker v. F & F Investment."s The
plaintiffs had brought a class suit under the federal Civil Rights Act of
1866,86 the fourteenth amendment and Illinois statutory law on behalf
of Negro homeowners in Chicago, alleging that Chicago real estate
developers had engaged in racial "block-busting" to gouge them with
excessive purchase prices.8 7 A primary potential element of their proof
was a magazine article written prior to the case (which had in fact
provided the factual basis for the complaint) by a distinguished
investigative journalist, Alfred Balk. In the article, entitled Confes-
procedure as all federal civil cases, pursuant to decree of the United States Supreme Court in
1966 (see 383 U.S. 1039 (1966) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Thus, since July 1, 1966 (the date that the
admiralty rules were merged into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), the applicability of state
privileges in admiralty cases is governed by the same rules as are all other federal civil cases. A
number of prior admiralty cases, however, had rejected the availability of state evidentiary
privileges to admiralty federal question cases. See, e.g., Redfern v. American President Lines,
Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 227, 231 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (attorney-client privilege); New England News-
paper Publishing Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 674, 679 (D. Mass. 1937) (Dead 'Man's
Statute). The fact that the plaintiff in Redfern was suing under the Jones Act as well as in
admiralty was apparently not accorded any consideration by the court, as it might have been in
view of the Mariner decision. By way of contrast, the courts have deferred to state law in several
other aspects of both admiralty and Jones Act litigation. Thus Mr. Justice Frankfurter cautioned
in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959): "Although the corpus
of admiralty law is federal .. to claim that all enforced rights pertaining to matters maritime are
rooted in federal law is a destructive oversimplification of the highly intricate interplay of the
States and the National Government in their regulation of maritime commerce. It is true that
state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads
on a harmonious system. But this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope." (footnote
omitted). See also Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832, 834-35 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,382
U.S. 1030 (1966); Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 259 n.1 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
Similarly, though some early federal decisions sought to justify ignoring state evidentiary
privileges in federal equity cases on the basis of the former distinctions between federal equity
and common law actions (see Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 144 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 849 (1945)), that type of distinction now lacks meaning under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which specifically merged the former federal equity jurisdiction into federal
common law jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. I & 43(a).
85. 339 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 & 1985(3) (1970).
87. The complaint was sustained and the facts fully discussed in an earlier decision. Contract
Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1970).
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sions of a Block-Buster, Mr. Balk had obtained and detailed a full
recitation of the modus operandi of a Chicago block-buster whom he
identified by the pseudonym "Norris Vitchek." The article was consid-
ered a major investigative breakthrough, and national civil rights
groups had reprinted and distributed it to their branches seeking to
combat block-busting. Since the publication of the article, Balk had
moved from fllinois to New York, where he was teaching at the
Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. When the plain-
tiffs deposed him in New York as a non-party witness, Balk answered
all substantive questions but declined to reveal the identity of Norris
Vitchek, claiming a privilege not to reveal his sources (under the first
amendment and state law) as a journalist. The plaintiffs moved in
New York to compel Balk to reveal his source. Although strongly in
sympathy with plaintiffs' case, Balk resisted, insisting (a) that to reveal
his source would destroy his ability to continue to operate as an
investigative journalist, since he would lose the confidence of his
sources, and (b) that, as a condition of obtaining the article, he and the
magazine had guaranteed Vitchek in writing not to reveal his identity
and faced a claim for indemnity by the source if they breached that
agreement and Vitchek were thereafter held liable for damages (in the
civil rights suit) as a result of his revelations to Balk. The court
rejected the claim of constitutional privilege, 88 and passed to the claim
of state privilege. The plaintiffs argued that, since the underlying
litigation was a federal question case based upon the strong federal
public policy in favor of civil rights liberalization, the court could not
uphold a privilege based upon state law. 89 Balk contended that it
would be an inexplicable anomaly of justice to order him to breach his
confidence when the plaintiffs' lawsuit might never have been possible
had he not obtained and printed the information in his article, since
Vitchek would not have revealed that information but for his reliance
88. Prior law appeared to sustain the conclusion that there was no such constitutional
privilege. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). But
cf. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). Thereafter, while the case was on
appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972),
which reversed Caldwell and definitively rejected the concept of any such constitutional privilege.
But in Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973), Chief
Judge Kaufman sought to limit the scope of Branzburg and may have resuscitated the possibility
of such a privilege somewhat.
89. Both New York (the deposition forum) and Illinois (the trial forum) had enacted statutory
journalists' privileges after the deposition but before the motion to require Balk to reveal his
source. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1974); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, §§ Ill et
seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974). The statutes were substantially similar, and hence the court found
it unnecessary to decide whether the law of the deposition state or trial state should predominate.
339 F. Supp. at 944.
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on Balk's assurance that as a journalist he would keep it confidential.
Moreover, Balk was merely a non-party witness and was not person-
ally involved in the allegedly wrongful conduct which supported the
plaintiffs' federal question claims. In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge
Dudley Bonsai acknowledged that "the issue must be resolved under
Federal law," 90 but then sought to balance the competing federal and
state interests presented, including the state public policies reflected in
the New York and Illinois statutes. He concluded that, on the facts
presented, the claim of privilege should be upheld. 9 ' The Second
Circuit affirmed and the United States Supreme Court declined to
review the case.
9 2
Baker had constitutional overtones and thus may not be entirely
representative of federal cases dealing with state evidentiary
privileges, but it embodies the correct approach to the problem:
namely, a flexible balancing of the competing federal and state public
policies, as applied to the facts presented. While it fails to answer some
of the problems presented (e.g., whether the law of the deposition state
or the trial state is predominant and what effect, if any, the inclusion
of state pendent claims should have on the claim of privilege), Baker
offers an excellent model for the courts to follow in other federal
question litigation.
In sum, the federal courts should adopt a balancing approach in
determining what effect to give to claims of state evidentiary privilege
in federal question litigation, focusing primarily on the strength and
nature of the competing federal and state public policies involved.
State evidentiary privileges should be accepted, unless there is an
overriding federal policy which would be undermined by deference to
the particular state privilege claimed or if it would be manifestly
inequitable to uphold the state privilege on the facts presented.
The federal policy will usually be cognizable from the nature of the
federal statute or other rights involved and its legislative and judicial
history (to the extent available). The state public policy will usually be
determinable from similar sources. Other factors which may be
examined to determine which of these two policies is predominant and
90. 339 F. Supp. at 944.
91. Id. at 945. "Balancing these interests in this case, and the belief that plaintiffs have other
ways of obtaining the information which they seek, the court concludes that Mr. Balk should not
be required to disclose his confidential source. This determination is consistent with the First
Amendment and the public policy of Illinois and New York." Id. This same type of balancing
test was recently applied by Judge Weinstein in a well-reasoned opinion upholding a journalist's
claim of privilege. Judge Weinstein's opinion is further noteworthy for its treatment of the
problem under the new Federal Rules of Evidence as well as current case law. See Apicella v.
McNeil Laboratories, Inc., Civil No. 74-635 (E.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 24, 1975).
92. See note 85 supra.
1975]
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should control in the particular case are: (a) whether the federal statute
affording federal jurisdiction grants the federal courts exclusive or only
concurrent jurisdiction; if the former, then a stronger case may exist
for disregarding state privileges than if state courts are simultaneously
deciphering and decreeing substantive law under the federal statute;
(b) whether decisional law on other substantive issues under the
federal statute tends to make reference to state law; if so, then
recognition of a state privilege may represent a lesser inroad to federal
uniformity and supremacy, than if not; (c) whether the federal statute is
part of an overall federal preemption or regulation of the field involved
(e.g., the Federal Communications Act)93 or merely affords a forum for
grievances which are essentially analogous to state law adjudications
(e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act);94 the massive gray area between
those extremes must be sorted out; (d) whether there are pendent state
claims in the case (e.g., state unfair competition claims in federal
antitrust litigation) and to what extent they are or will be actually
involved in the trial; (e) whether deference to the state privilege will
necessarily alter the outcome of the litigation (as in Courtland) or is
merely one of several avenues available to the discovery or testimony
involved (as in Baker); (f) whether the person asserting the state
privilege relied on the privilege at the time of the conduct involved
(e.g., an attorney-client communication) or whether the claim of
privilege is a mere afterthought conjured up or realized for the first
time during the litigation (e.g., reliance on the Dead Man's Statute); (g)
whether the person asserting the privilege is merely a witness or
actually a party to the litigation; more deference should normally be
accorded a good faith claim of privilege by a non-party witness, unless
he is centrally involved in the merits of the controversy being litigated
(e.g., a co-conspirator or the accountant for an alleged wrongdoer in a
bankruptcy or securities fraud case). Other factors more directly linked
to the particular fact situation will undoubtedly arise as more cases are
presented and decided on the point.
While hard and fast rules might make the courts' task easier and
more predictable, state evidentiary privileges deserve more in-depth
treatment since they involve substantive rights and policies of poten-
tially great importance, not only to the persons involved but to society
in general. Neither the mere existence of a state privilege nor the
possibly fortuitous circumstance that the conduct involved is being
tested in a federal question case should determine the matter once and
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
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for all. Moreover, a case-by-case analysis may well deter forum
shopping, since an ad hoc test should prevent definitive predictability
of result for particular courts. In any event, if the ultimate aim of
choice of law rules is to provide "a solution which, from the perspec-
tive of the legal order in question, is the most appropriate (or 'apt')
regulation for the situation that has arisen. . . ,9 then the balancing
approach would appear most likely to achieve justice in the maximum
number of instances.
V. STATE PRIVILEGES UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
As now adopted by Congress and signed into law, the Federal Rules
of Evidence leave the question of state evidentiary privileges where it
presently stands under the case law. 9 6 The congressional rules do not
codify a federal pronouncement of precisely which state privileges are
to be "federal" evidentiary privileges as well, available in all federal
litigation, as the original draftsmen of the rules, as endorsed by the
United States Supreme Court, had proposed. 97 The genesis of article V
(the portion covering evidentiary privileges) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is interesting and of possible importance to future decisions
on the question.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which is directed by
federal statute to "carry on a continuous study" and recommend
95. Von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Sig-
nificance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 347, 350 (1974).
96. After much debate and hearings in both houses of Congress, Congress enacted the
Federal Rules and President Ford signed them into law in January 1975, to become effective July
1, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595 (Jan. 2, 1975) (reprinted in 43 U.S.L.W. 137-44 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1975)). Rule 501, as enacted, is the version proposed by the House Judiciary Committee; it is
quoted in note 127 infra. Another provision of the congressional statute (detailed in notes 140-41
infra) provides that no future federal evidence rules may be promulgated regarding evidentiary
privileges until Congress has first reviewed them and approved them by specific statute.
The development of, and the alternate proposals for, the privilege portion of the Federal Rules
(article V) are detailed below. At the outset, however, it should be noted that the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not deal specifically with the added question: which state's law should be applied or
referred to as the source of "federal common law" in a multistate situation where the different
states have conflicting public policies? Hopefully, in such situations, the courts will adopt the
liberal attitudes contained in the discussion and cases in Parts III and IV above. As we have seen,
determining whether federal or state law controls is only the threshold question; it is often far
more difficult and significant to determine which state's law should control or be the model for
federal common law.
97. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Revised Draft]. See also Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183. 230-61 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Supreme Court Draft].
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proposed "general rules of practice and procedure" to the United States
Supreme Court, 98 resolved in March 1961 to establish an Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence.9 9 In 1962, a Special Committee of
the Judical Conference, which Chief Justice Earl Warren had ap-
pointed in 1961, further resolved that it was both feasible and desira-
ble to prescribe uniform rules of evidence for federal litigation.100
Thereafter, in 1965 the Chief Justice appointed a distinguished Advi-
sory Committee on Rules of Evidence, chaired by Chicago attorney
Albert Jenner, to draft such rules after soliciting suggestions from the
bar, bench and legal scholars. 10 ' The Advisory Committee issued two
drafts: one in 1969 and one in 1971.102 Ultimately the United States
Supreme Court (by an eight to one vote) approved the second draft of
the proposed rules in November of 1972, to become effective on July 1,
1973.103
The Judiciary Committees of both houses of Congess immediately
were flooded with a flurry of criticism of the new rules, especially
article V. 10 4 In response, Congess passed a hastily drafted bill'0 5
which deferred the rules becoming effective until Congress could study
98. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The Supreme Court itself has authority to promulgate procedural
rules to regulate the practice of the federal courts by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1970).
99. Note, Congressional Preemption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 49 Wash. L. Rev.
1184 (1974). See also Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evidence-An Attempt at Uniformity in
Federal Courts, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 1061 (1969).
100. See Rules of Evidence-A Preliminary Report, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75 (1962). See also
Comment, The Privilege Doctrine and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 Syracuse L.
Rev. 1173 (1973).
101. Rothstein, supra note 61, at 125 n.3. Other distinguished members of the Committee
included Federal Judges Jack Weinstein (see note 9 supra) and Charles Joiner (see note 108 infra).
The reporter was Professor Edward Cleary.
102. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969); Revised Draft, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
103. Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973). Justice William 0. Douglas was the lone
dissenter, arguing that the rules exceeded the enabling legislation and that the rules had not first
been carefully enough thought out by the Court itself. Id. at 185-86.
104. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 65 (Supp., Jan. 15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; S. Rep. No.
93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 41 (Supp.,
Jan. 15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]. Former United States Supreme Court Justice
Arthur Goldberg, for one, considered the adoption of the rules by the Court to be unconstitu-
tional legislation by the judiciary. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1973, at 16, col. 1. Then Chief Judge
Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also opposed
adopting uniform federal rules of evidence, arguing primarily that there is no need for such
uniform rules, that evidence issues do not readily lend themselves to codification and that
uniform federal rules may result in improper overruling of substantive state public policies, as In
the case of privileges. See House Report 2.
105. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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and possibly amend them. Thereafter the two congressional Judiciary
Committees began hearings on the rules.' 06
Underlying the tempest regarding article V were two principal
controversies: first, are privileges merely procedural (as the Advisory
Committee assumed) 0 7 or are they substantive (as the weight of other
authority has held);' 0 8 and secondly, should the Supreme Court have
taken it upon itself to propose such sweeping generalized rules?10 9
The predominant view is that the Supreme Court does have the
power to promulgate procedural evidentiary rules, but that Congress
has the further power to regulate and amend those rules since the
Court's authority itself emanates from a congressional delegation of its
own legislative powers.' I1 However, since most authority supports the
view that privileges are substantive rather than procedural in nature,
it has been argued that the Court's rule-making power does not extend
to the area of evidentiary privileges."'
Article V as proposed by the Advisory Committee sought to detail
specifically what privileges would be cognizable in all federal litiga-
tion, to the exclusion of all other possible claims of privilege. 112 The
106. See Note, supra note 99, at 1185-86; N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1973, at 6, col. 1, The delay
was applauded by, inter alia, the American Bar Association. Comment, The Privilege Doctrine
and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 Syracuse L. Rev. 1173, 1174 (1973).
107. See Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 233 (Advisory Committee Notes); Revised
Draft, 51 F.R.D. at 359 (1971).
108. See notes 33 & 35 supra and accompanying text; Weinstein, supra note 9, at 545. See
also Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich.
L. Rev. 623, 651 (1957); Louisell, supra note 10, at 115-16.
109. See note 103 supra. Professor Charles Alan Wright has cautioned: "The Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence has ... defined those privileges it thinks should be recognized
and has expressly refused to honor broader state privileges. That the Supreme Court has the
power to adopt rules to this effect, and that they can be applied even in diversity cases, seems
clear from Hanna v. Plumer [380 U.S. 460 (1965)]. That the Court ought to follow a course that
will produce such a serious intrusion on state policies is highly doubtful." C. Wright, Federal
Courts § 93, at 415 (2d ed. 1970) (footnotes omitted); accord, Weinberg, Choice of Law and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New Perspectives, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 594, 597 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Weinberg].
110. See, e.g., Krattenmaker,'supra note 60, at 61-67; Suffolk Note, supra note 22, at 1219.
But cf. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 i1.
L. Rev. 276 (1928).
111. Note, supra note 99, at 1193. Compare Suffolk Note 1219 (arguing that Congress has the
power to legislate rules on all aspects of evidentiary matters for the federal courts).
112. Rule 501 of the Advisory Committee rules, as promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court, thus provided: "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; or (2)
Refuse to disclose any matter, or (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or (4) Prevent
another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing."
Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 230.
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Advisory Committee insisted that "there are persuasive answers" to
the "arguments advanced in favor of recognizing state privileges."' 13
In federal question litigation, the Advisory Committee found its "an-
swer" simply in "the supremacy of federal law."''1 4 In diversity cases,
the Advisory Committee argued (1) that privileges are not truly
matters of substance since they tend to arise only as an "incident" of a
case and are "called into operation, not when the relation giving rise to
the privilege is being litigated, but when the litigation involves some-
thing substantively devoid of relation to the privilege;"' '15 (2) that since
state privileges are not recognized in federal criminal litigation, which
is more "sensitive" than civil litigation, they should not be recognized
in the latter either;' 16 (3) that "[t]he demise of conformity and the
113. Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 233-34. Interestingly, the draftsmen did provide for
reference to state law in other aspects of their proposed rules of evidence (e.g., rule 302, regarding
presumptions in civil diversity cases (56 F.R.D. at 211)).
114. Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 232-33. Without examining the cases in detail, the
Advisory Committee flatly stated that: "While a number of the cases [which refused to recognize
state evidentiary privileges] arise from administrative income tax investigations, they nevertheless
support the broad proposition of the inapplicability of state privileges in federal proceedings.
"In view of these considerations ...to the extent that they accord state privileges standing
. the rules go beyond what previously has been thought necessary or proper." Id. at 232.
As shown in detail above, this pronouncement appears to be unjustifiably self-serving and
simply fails to grapple with the problem in sufficient detail.
115. Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 233. While the Advisory Committee may be
accurate in this statement, it does not follow that privileges are not "substantive" in nature. All it
means is that, in most cases, the assertion of the privilege is not the focal issue. But if the witness
actually relied on the privilege in his conduct outside of the litigation, to sweep it away because
his conduct was tangential to the litigation is simply to close one's eyes to the nature of the policy
underlying privileges: namely that the state wishes to recognize and foster the confidential
relationship involved. The context of that relationship in the particular case at hand may be a
factor to consider (e.g., to see if there is a specific compelling federal interest in conflict with the
state policy, or to determine whether the witness is acting in good faith). But it surely should not
dictate a black letter disposal of the privilege altogether. Otherwise no one could ever rely upon
the state's promise of confidentiality for fear that any communication might (because of what the
Advisory Committee calls the "accident of diversity") come under the scrutiny of a federal court
and thus have to be disclosed, even if presented in a context related solely to state-created rights
and state law issues. If such were or is to be the case, the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of
Evidence will have unwittingly countermanded all state privilege policy by making every
privileged communication susceptible to disclosure in virtually any type of litigation, regardless of
the issue. The fact that privileges may not be available in certain specific federal litigation
situations (see note 128 infra), does not mean that they are "illusory" or should be abandoned
wholesale in federal cases regardless of the non-criminal and non-fraudulent nature of the
privileged communications.
116. Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 233. This reasoning seems to be simply a
makeweight. Even in matters of constitutional privilege (e.g., the privilege against self incrimina-
tion), major distinctions exist'between the availability and nature of the privilege in criminal as
opposed to civil litigation. See, e.g., Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 121,
141-55 (1972).
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adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" represent a
paramount federal government "concern in the quality of judicial
administration conducted under its aegis;"' " 7 and (4) that "forum
shopping is recognized as legitimate in the American judicial system"
so that it is irrelevant that litigants may choose between the federal
and state courts based upon the divergent views which would exist on
the privilege issue."18
None of these arguments is particularly convincing."19 All seem to
have been fashioned to justify a philosophical predisposition that
evidentiary privileges are really only procedural in nature and, regard-
less, are an annoying impediment to full and unfettered testimony and
117. 56 F.R.D. at 233. This argument appears similar to the one raised in some of the cases,
but rejected in most, that the mere existence of rule 43(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., virtually preempts the
field as to state evidentiary privileges. Cf. note 24 supra and accompanying text-
118. 56 F.R.D. at 234. The "forum shopping" argument obviously has a double edge and,
indeed, is often difficult to articulate. A case-by-case analysis will also foster a certain amount of
forum shopping, but elimination of forum shopping is certainly not the paramount concern
involved when state privileges are involved. Yet it must be said that the Advisory Committee's
undocumented conclusory treatment of this matter smacks of a platitude, not a well reasoned or
studied analysis.
119. See notes 115-18 supra. See also Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma
Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 353, 361-73 (1969). Judge
Weinstein aptly summarized the argument for uniformity which underlies the entire concept of
having federal rules of evidence: "IL]ooked at from the vantage point of Washington, the pressure
towards uniform rules of evidence in the federal courts is great. It would make it easier to move
judges from state to state to meet temporary litigation pressures and thus would accommodate the
strong administrative tendency towards a more integrated and efficient federal judicial system. It
gives recognition to a growing liational bar practicing in the federal courts and the deirability of
making it easier for both lawyers and their national clients to find an equal grade of justice
administered by familiar procedure in any federal court in the country. Where federal substantive
policies are being enforced, a more uniform policy is fairer and more predictable and is likely to
strengthen and bind the nation together." Id. at 359.
Others take serious issue with this position, arguing (a) that a new federal codification of
evidence rules will put unfair burdens on the practicing bar (most of whom, as this view
maintains, do not practice out of their home states) to distinguish between it and their local state
evidence law; (b) that federal trial judges are largely drawn from the local bar anyway and sit
elsewhere only infrequently, and (c) that "Judge Weinstein's argument that federal evidentiary
law would make uniform the administration of federal substantive law overlooks the extensive
concurrent jurisdiction of federal questions exercised by state courts and their sizable exclusive
jurisdiction over numerous federal questions" where the amount involved is less than $10,000.
Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: New Prospectives, 122
U. Pa. L. Rev. 594, 604 (1974); see Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43
Hare. L. Rev. 554, 584 (1930). See also note 124 infra & note 61 supra.
These conflicting views illustrate the substantial and sometimes bitter difference of opinion
which exists over whether there should be uniform federal rules of evidence at all. Notwithstand-
ing some persuasive advocacy to the contrary (especially Ms. Weinberg's excellent article), the
argument in favor of federal rules on procedural questions appears to be the more persuasive.
However, a sharp distinction appears appropriate for substantive matters such as evidentiary
privileges, as to which the interest of uniformity appears less persuasive, if persuasive at all.
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disclosure. That view, as already noted, appears to be a minority view
among the courts, and, in any event, one which has been severely
criticized. 120
Several critics of the proposed article V sought to persuade the
Advisory Committee to correct apparent errors or reinstate stricken
privileges (such as the doctor-patient privilege). 12 1 The consensus
among the critics was that the draftsmen had simply gone too far in
attempting to codify the area and, in doing so, had given too little
thought to important substantive questions which were better dealt
with under previously existing case law. 122 On the other hand, others
120. See notes 33, 35 & 108 supra. For example, Professor Thomas G. Krattenmaker has
criticized the Advisory Committee's position regarding diversity litigation as follows: "Tile
decision reflected in the Rules, then, to give no weight in diversity cases to state privileges
virtually is unprecedented. Nevertheless, in the course of the hearings in the House, Professor
Cleary stated, 'I think we would have to say that the present law is unsettled in the diversity
area. The cases are in disagreement as to whether you apply a State-created privilege or not.'
[Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before The Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]]. It is exceedingly hard to believe that such a statement could be uttered
with a straight face by anyone who had read the cases in this field with a modicum of care."
Krattenmaker, supra note 60, at 105 n.176.
The significance of such a departure from case law was aptly emphasized by Mr. Justice
Douglas in his dissent from the promulgation of the rules: "[T]his Court does not write the Rules,
nor supervise their writing, nor appraise them on their merits, weighing the pros and cons. Tile
Court concededly is a mere conduit. Those who write the Rules are members of a Committee
named by the Judicial Conference. The members are eminent; but they are the sole judges of tile
merits of the proposed Rules, our approval being merely perfunctory. In other words, we are
merely the conduit to Congress. Yet the public assumes that our imprimatur is on the Rules, as of
course it is." Supreme Court Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 185.
121. See, e.g., Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
Geo. L.J. 125 (1973).
122. Not all of the criticism involved the Advisory Committee's apparent bias against
privileges. For example, almost paradoxically, the draftsmen provided in rule 5 13 that:
"(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present
proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No
inference may be drawn therefrom.
"(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted,
to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the
knowledge of the jury.
"(c) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse
inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be drawn
therefrom." 56 F.R.D. at 260.
This rule might find broad general support in the cases arising from criminal proceedings (see,
e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Courtney v. United States, 390 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 857 (1968)) and cases involving certain claims of privilege in civil
litigation (see, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Durkee, 147 F. 99 (2d Cir. 1906); A.B. Dick Co. v.
Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (Medina, J.), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952)). But it totally ignores other lines of civil cases, such as
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also praised article V of the rules as an enlightened and long overdue
expression of uniform federal law on the point. 2 3 Still others, while
those dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination-which was the particular privilege
cited by the Advisory Committee as an illustration in its own note to rule 513 (56 F.R.D. at 260).
Substantial federal and state authority exists for precisely the opposite rule when a party invokes
his privilege against self incrimination in civil litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Mammoth Oil
Co., 14 F.2d 705, 729 (8th Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 13 (1927); United Elec. Radio & Mach.
Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1954), afl'd in part and vacated in part
on other grounds, 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956); Kaminsky, supra
note 116, at 143-55 and state and federal cases cited therein. By its broad pronouncements in rule
513, the Advisory Committee would have unintentionally, but inexcusably, abrogated that
well-settled rule because of its inadvertent failure to review the civil cases dealing with refusals to
testify based upon the self incrimination privilege, an area which is fraught with potential abuse
by claimants of the privilege. See Kaminsky, supra.
Moreover, the cases actually reflect a substantial difference of opinion as to what comment or
inferences can be made regarding a claim of evidentiary privilege based upon state statutory law
in civil litigation. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 906, 909-13 (1970) and 34 A.L.R.3d 775 (1970) and
cases cited therein. See also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2322, at 630 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence (1942) provided in its rule 233 that: "If a
privilege to refuse to disclose, or a privilege to prevent another from disclosing, a matter is
claimed and allowed, the judge and counsel may comment thereon, and the trier of fact may
draw all reasonable inferences therefrom." That rule appears to be the preferable view, but a
detailed law review article on this subject would certainly be a benefit to the courts and bar alike.
123. See, e.g., Suffolk Note, supra note 22. Albert Jenner, Chairman of the Advisory
Committee, took special issue with rule 601 of the House draft of H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 2d Sem.
(1974), the version eventually enacted into law, which provides: "Every person is competent to be
a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law." Fed. R.
Evid. 601.
The Supreme Court draft of rule 601 had provided merely that: "Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules." 56 F.R.D. at 261.
The Advisory Committee Notes show that the draftsmen viewed the Dead Man's Statute as
within the purview of rule 601 and not article V. The cases do not appear fully to agree. See note
80 supra and accompanying text. Mr. Jenner argued that the House amendment would reinstate
the Dead Man's Statute in diversity cases which he described as a major injustice to "honest
litigants":
"Now, exactly what that does in diversity cases is to require the district court sitting in a
particular State to apply the Dead Man's Statute if there is one in that State. First the court must
find out what the terms of the Dead Man's Statute are in that State. The lawyers have to study
and restudy it and reorient themselves as to where it applies and of course, so do the Federal
judges. There is no Dead Man's Statute that is the same from State-to-State, not one. There are
many States that have no Dead Man's Statute at all, and they have done very, very well.
"This is a destruction of a measure of uniformity; it is an abandonment on the part of the
Congress of the United States to allow State Legislatures to pass Dead Man's Statutes under local
persuasion. This is really a disservice to the law of evidence. What it does is interpose serious
roadblocks in the way of honest litigants. All this issue concerns, Mr. Chairman, is the credibility
of witnesses. I have tried many jury cases now in a little over 43 years, and juries are very, very
alert about conferences or statements attributed by one who is a live litigant about what some
person who is dead said back in the past. The witness is subject to cross-examination.
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supporting the notion of uniform rules, recognized that the Supreme
Court draft had many problems and urged that the federal privilege
rules be amended to be more "in general accord with the policies
behind prevailing state privileges where such policies seem at all
justifiable." 124 In the meantime, relying on the Supreme Court's
imprimatur for the proposed draft of the rules, several federal judges
proceeded to apply the proposed article V as a matter of comity.125
After conducting its own hearings on the matter, 126 the House
Judiciary Committee sided with the critics and resolved to strike
article V in its entirety and, essentially, to replace it by referring the
"What is done by the rule as submitted by the Court is not what these State Dead Man's
Statutes do: they block off relevant evidence that should be admitted. The States can't make up
their minds from State-to-State, even from session-to-session of the Legislature what the Dead
Man's Statute is going to be." Hearings on the Federal Rules of Evidence before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
Mr. Jenner's view demonstrates the underlying premises on which the Advisory Committee
appears to have operated; namely, that uniformity is the paramount concern and that tile
Advisory Committee would determine once and for all which privileges are just and which are
not. The flaw in this reasoning is illustrated in Justice Douglas' dissent, quoted in note 115
supra. This is not to quarrel with the substance of Mr. Jenner's remarks regarding the Dead
Man's Statute. Rather it is to say that such ultimate judgments on substantive matters such as
privileges should be made by the legislature, if on an overall basis, or the courts, if on an ad hoc
basis. These judgments should not be delegated definitely to an ex officio committee, no matter
how distinguished and learned its members. Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee
rejected Mr. Jenner's views and proposed amendments to the House's rule 601 only to conform It
to the Senate's suggested version of rule 501, so as to read: "Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings,
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28 U.S.C. § 1335, or between citizens of different States and
remanded under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the competency of a witness is determined In accordance
with State Law, unless with respect to the particular claim or defense, Federal law supplies the
rule of decision." Senate Report, supra note 100, at 13. As already indicated, Congress also
rejected Mr. Jenner's view and enacted the House's version of rule 601.
124. Rothstein, supra note 61, at 130-3 1. Professor Rothstein reasoned that, if the rules could
be corrected, uniformity was desirable since "[slufficient experience has been accumulated
concerning evidence questions to permit definite choices in most areas, including privileges." Id.
at 130. Moreover, he argued, "divergence between state and federal law will diminish as states
imitate the federal rules." Id. at 131 (footnote omitted). He predicted this on the basis of what
had occurred after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted and upon the fact that a
number of states already had adopted evidence rules patterned after drafts of the proposed
federal rules. Id. at n.28. See, e.g., Symposium, Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence, 53 Neb.
L. Rev. 331 (1974). But cf. Weinberg, supra note 109, arguing that "if the history of state
adoption of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Model Code of Evidence is any guide, this
early showing will not in fact develop into a significant trend" of state adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 613 (footnote omitted).
125. See, e.g., Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Il1. 1972) (refusing
to recognize the Illinois statutory accountant-client privilege in a federal securities action on the
basis of proposed rule 501 of the Supreme Court Draft).
126. See House Hearings, supra note 120. The House Judiciary Committee conducted six
days of hearings. House Report 5.
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courts to the case law.' 27 The House Committee draft tracked rule 26
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for federal question
cases, 12 8 but sought to engraft upon it a new exception that made state
law govern claims of privilege asserted regarding any "claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision . *... ' -9 The new
"exception" would apply in diversity cases and also leave state
privileges available in federal question cases involving state law issues,
to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 30 As with the Supreme Court
draft, the House draft made no attempt to specify which state's law
should govern, or be the model for federal common law in multistate
situations such as those raised in the Palmer, Cepeda and Baker cases,
but rather confined itself to the threshold issue of whether state law
will be considered or followed at all.
The House proposal for article V produced its own flurry of criticism
and discontent, ranging from those who simply did not like the
House's draftsmanship to those who favored the basic concept of the
Supreme Court version.' 3' Thus the Senate Judiciary Committee
127. Rule 501, as proposed by the House Judiciary Committee (H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973)) and now adopted into law, reads: "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution
of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in
civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law." Fed. R. Evid.
501.
128. Fed. R. Crim. P. 26 provides: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The
admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience."
The cases hold that federal, not state, law controls under Fed. R. Crim. P. 26, and Bankruptcy
Act § 21, 11 U.S.C. § 44 (1970). See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); cases cited
in note 57 supra. Therefore, it may be argued with some force that the protection afforded by
state evidentiary privilege statutes is illusory. See, e.g., note 133 infra. However, these limited
exceptions involve areas of strong federal interest and do not appear to provide a proper basis for
ignoring state privileges altogether in all federal litigation. Cf. note 115 supra.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. The House Committee reasoned: "The rationale underlying the proviso [passed by the
House] is that federal law should not supersede that of the States in substantive areas such as
privilege absent a compelling reason. The Committee believes that in civil cases in the federal
courts where an element of a claim or defense is not grounded upon a federal question, there is no
federal interest strong enough to justify departure from State policy." House Report 9. As shown
in note 137 infra, the Senate Judiciary Committee adopted this same rationale
131. See Rothstein 128; Suffolk Note 1218-19 n.8.
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conducted its own hearings in June of 1974. Professor James Moore,
author of the leading multi-volume treatise on federal practice, termed
the House proposal meritorious "as an interim statement"but
"deficient" as a "long range" rule, primarily since it would "lead to
confusion" in cases involving federal and pendent non-federal
claims.1 32 The United States Judicial Conference's Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Evidence and the Advisory Committee which drafted
the Supreme Court version of the rules submitted a joint statement
defending the Supreme Court draft and criticizing the House proposal
for imprudently injecting "an element of doubt" in federal cases as to
whether the privilege would or would not apply.' 3
3
The staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee submitted its own
memorandum tracing the history of the House bill and the reasoning of
132. Senate Hearings, supra note 123, at 356, 360. Professor Moore's prepared statement
read: "As to a non-federal issue, state law determines privilege under proposed 501, supra. This is
workable (although not necessarily the most desirable) rule when the non-federal issue stands by
itself or is cleanly separable from federal issues in the case. Very often, however, federal and
non-federal issues are intertwined, as, for example, in cases involving pendent jurisdiction or
where a federal statute partially incorporates state law such as § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act on
preferences. In these situations, I believe the rule proposed by the House will lead to confusion."
Id. at 277.
Professor Paul F. Rothstein, a prominent authority and author on evidence (see, e.g., note 61
supra), argued in a prepared statement: "Art. V (in common with the provisions in Rule 302 and
601) renders litigation involving mixed federal and state issues much too complex respecting
evidentiary matters. Evidence on state issues is made subject to state evidence law; evidence on
federal issues is made subject to federal evidence law. But more than that, evidence on state
issues is subject to state evidence law only when an ultimate fact is sought to be proved (i.e.,
when an "element" is sought to be proved), as opposed to a mediate fact (a mediate fact is a step
along the way and is not an "element'). Thus, two bodies of privilege law (or competency law or
presumption law) must be applied and mastered, in the same case: federal and state law; and
indeed, if a witness' statement is relevant on both a federal and a state issue, e.g. in a joined
antitrust and unfair competition claim, the evidence may be allowed to be considered on one but
not the other." Senate Hearings 265 (footnote omitted).
133. Senate Hearings 60. The Joint Committee stated: "Believing that privileges in the
federal courts should be uniform and governed by federal law, the Joint Committees are unable
to concur with the treatment givdn privilege by H.R. 5463. While Rules 502-513 if enacted as
prescribed by the Court would give a strong thrust in the direction of uniformity in criminal
prosecutions, federal question cases, and generally in bankruptcy, the proposed amendment
injects an element of doubt. Experience under Rule 26 of the Criminal Rules offers small
encouragement for the evolution of a comprehensive and uniform scheme of privileges through
the decision-making process.... [T]he House's Rule 501 would leave privileges created by State
law in the peculiar posture of being effective in diversity cases but ineffective in all other federal
cases, notably in criminal cases, which undoubtedly lie in the area of greatest sensitivity. With
these privileges thus rendered largely illusory, their limited recognition is explainable only In
terms of possible impact on the outcome of litigation, a result that has been rejected generally
elsewhere in the federal procedural field." Id.
Somewhat surprisingly, U.S. District Court Judge Charles W. Joiner submitted a prepared
statement essentially supporting this view. Senate Hearings 73.
1975] EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES
the House Judiciary Committee staff, with which it concurred. It
explained that "since it was clear [to the House staff] that no agree-
ment was likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege
rules," it was better to leave the law in "its current condition to be
developed by the courts" on an ad hoc basis, rather than to bog down
the entire package of evidentiary rules. 134
As a result of its hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee suggested
several amendments to the House bill including some in the new rule
501.135 The Senate version of rule 501 sought merely to minimize the
confusion of which Professor Moore and others had warned was likely
to be created by the House's reference to a "claim or defense" governed
by state law, especially where pendent state claims are tried with
federal question claims. 136 In other respects, the Senate Committee
134. Senate Hearings 343. The Senate Staff Memorandum stated: "Since it was clear that no
agreement was likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules, and since the
inability to agree threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire Rules package, the
Subcommittee unanimously determined that the specific privilege Rules proposed by the Court
should be eliminated and a single Rule (Rule 501) substituted, leaving the law in its current
condition to be developed by the courts of the United States utilizing the principles of the
common law. In addition, a proviso was approved requiring Federal courts to recognize and
apply state privilege law in civil cases governed by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, [304 U S. 64
(1938),] as under present Federal case law." Id. at 356-57; accord, House Report 8-9.
135. The Senate version of rule 501 would have read: "Except as otherwise required by the
Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience-
However, in civil actions and proceedings arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or 28 U.S.C. § 1335, or
between citizens of different States and removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision there [sic] is determined in accor-
dance with State law, unless with respect to the particular claim of [sic] defense, Federal law
supplies the rule of decision." Senate Report, supra note 104, at 15-16.
The House bill was slightly different, as noted in the Senate Report; indeed, the Senate Report
described the proposed Senate amendment to rule 501 as merely "technical." Id. at 7. Both
versions provided for essentially the same case-by-case analysis. See also House Report, supra
note 104, at 8-9.
136. "The committee is concerned that the language used in the House amendment could be
difficult to apply. It provides that 'in civil actions. . . with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,' State law on privilege applies. The
question of what is an element of a claim or defense is likely to engender considerable litigation.
If the matter in question constitutes an element of a claim, State law supplies the privilege rule;
whereas if it is a mere item of proof with respect to a claim, then, even though State law might
supply the rule of decision, Federal law on the privilege would apply. Further, disputes will arise
as to how the rule should be applied in an antitrust action or in a tax case where the Federal
statute is silent as to a particular aspect of the substantive law in question, but Federal cases had
incorporated State law by reference to State law. Is a claim (or defense) based on such a reference
a claim or defense as to which federal or State law supplies the rule of decision?
"Another problem not entirely avoidable is the complexity or difficulty the rule introduces into
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expressed its agreement "with the main thrust of the House amend-
ment"137 and explained its proposed rule (which it described as only a
"technical amendment" of the House rule) as follows:
The formulation adopted by the House is pregnant with litigious mischief. The
committee has, therefore, adopted what we believe will be a clearer and more practical
guideline for determining when courts should respect State rules of privilege. Basical-
ly, it provides that in criminal and Federal question civil cases, federally evolved rules
on privilege should apply since it is Federal policy which is being enforced. Converse-
ly, in diversity cases where the litigation in question turns on a substantive question of
State law, and is brought in the Federal courts because the parties reside in different
States, the committee believes it is clear that State rules of privilege should apply
unless the proof is directed at a claim or defense for which Federal law supplies the
rule of decision (a situation which would not commonly arise).'3 8
Regarding article V, the Senate Committee in conclusion emphasized
that its proposal and that of the House "should be understood as
reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship and other privileges should be determined on
a case-by-case basis.'
13 9
The Senate Committee also accepted the basic tenet of the House
Committee's proposed section 2 to H.R. 5463, which specifically
empowers the Supreme Court to "prescribe amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, such amendments not to take effect however until
they have been reported to Congress," so that Congress will have an
opportunity to pass upon and disapprove them. But the Senate Com-
mittee suggested (without stating its reasons) deletion of the proviso
in the House Committee's section 2 which requires that any such
amendment of the Federal Rules of Evidence which deals with article
V cannot become effective until or unless passed by an act of Con-
gress. 14 0 As passed by Congress this particular House provision remains
the trial of a Federal case containing a combination of Federal and State claims and defenses, e.g.
an action involving Federal antitrust and State unfair competition claims. Two different bodies of
privilege law would need to be consulted. It may even develop that the same witness-testimony
might be relevant on both counts and privileged as to one but not the other." Senate Report 12
(footnotes omitted).
137. Id. at 11. The Senate Committee explained the "thrust" of the House proposal, with
which it specifically expressed its agreement, as follows: "[Tihe proviso as passed by the House...
reflects the view that in civil cases in the Federal courts, where a claim or defense asserted is not
grounded upon a Federal question, there is no Federal interest in the application, or in its
resolution, of a uniform law of Federal privilege strong enough to justify departure from State
policy. Another rationale for the proviso is that the Court's proposal would have prompted forum
shopping in some civil actions, depending upon differences in the privilege law applied as among
the State and Federal courts. The House provision, on the other hand, under which the Federal
court is bound to apply the State's privilege law in actions founded on a State-created right,
might limit the incentive to shop." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at !2 (footnote omitted).
139. Id. at 13.
140. The new provision will be codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2076. Its last sentence, which was
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intact. 1 4 1
As already indicated, 142 the Senate Judiciary Committee's sugges-
tions regarding rule 501 apparently fell on deaf ears, for Congress
ultimately adopted the House version. 143 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, as passed by Congress, were signed into law by President
Gerald Ford under date of January 2, 1975, to become effective 180
days later.144 Thus, although Congress has now officially passed upon
the question whether state evidentiary privileges should be given effect
in federal litigation, it has merely adopted the majority lines of current
proposed by New York Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman and is included in § 2 of H.R. 5463,
as enacted into law, provides that: "Any such amendment [to the Federal Rules of Evidence
prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court] creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall have
no force or effect unless it shall be approved by act of Congress." Senate Hearings 360. See also
House Report 27-29 (Separate Views of Representative Holtzman).
141. See Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 2 (Jan. 2, 1975) (reprinted in full in 43 U.S.L.W. 144 (U.S
Jan. 14, 1975)). See also House Conference Rep. No. 93-1597. 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1974),
reprinted in U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 88 (Supp., Jan. 15, 1975) (hereinafter cited as
Conference Report], noting that other more technical changes in § 2 suggested by the Senate (e.g..
that Congress expressly retain the power to amend any rule of evidence) were adopted in the final
bill.
The rules also provide that: "The rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all
actions, cases and proceedings." Fed. R. Evid. 1101(c). This provides the same scope for rule 501
as the draftsmen of the Federal Rules had proposed for their own article V. See Supreme Court
Draft, 56 F.R.D. at 347; Revised Draft, 51 F.R.D. at 462.
142. See note 96 supra.
143. As occurs when the two Houses of Congress pass amendments to. or slightly different
versions of the same bill, a joint legislative conference was held in December 1974. after the
Senate passed the Senate Judiciary Committee version in November of 1974 (120 Cong. Rec. S,
19896, S. 19908-17 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974)). Following the conference, some of the Senate
proposals were accepted (e.g., rule 301), some reamended to create compromise positions (e.g..
rule 803(24)) and some (e.g., rules 501 & 601) rejected and abandoned. See Conference Report
which is the official joint conference report on the bill as passed. The Conference Report
explained its conclusion as follows:
"The rule in the House bill applies to evidence that relates to 'an element of a claim or defense.'
If an item of proof tends to support or defeat a claim or defense, or an element of a claim or
defense, and if state law supplies the rule of decision for that claim or defense, then state privilege
law applies to that item of proof.
"Under the provision in the House bill, therefore, state privilege law %ill usually apply in
diversity cases. There may be diversity cases, however, where a claim or defense is based upon
federal law. In such instances, federal privilege law will apply to evidence relevant to the federal
claim or defense. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
"In nondiversity jurisdiction civil cases, federal privilege law will generally apply. In those
situations where a federal court adopts or incorporates state law to fill interstices or gaps in
federal statutory phrases, the court generally will apply federal privilege law. . . . when a federal
court chooses to absorb state law, it is applying the state law as a matter of federal common law."
Conference Report 7-8.
As already observed (note 96 supra), no attempt was made to codify guidelines to deal with the
specific choice of law (as among different states) necessary where multistate fact situations are
presented, as discussed in Parts M and IV supra.
144. See notes 96 & 143 supra.
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decisional law, leaving future cases to be decided on a case-by-case
basis with careful attention given to the countervailing federal and
state public policies involved. Rule 501 thus appears essentially to
have codified the same balancing test recommended hereinabove. 45
VI. CONCLUSION
State evidentiary privileges are matters of substantive law which
should not be discarded or blithely ignored by the federal courts absent
a countervailing federal public policy or manifest inequity on the facts
presented. In diversity cases, federal courts should apply and defer to
state evidentiary privileges, as they do with other state substantive
law. In federal question cases, federal courts should determine their
own federal common law regarding evidentiary privileges; but in doing
so, they should give weight to, carefully consider and, where not
inappropriate in the light of the federal policy involved, defer to the
state public policy and interests (as indicated by the factors outlined
above) which underlie the claim of privilege. The ultimate determina-
tion in federal question litigation should be made by applying an
interest balancing test on a case-by-case basis. Where more than one
state's public policy is involved, in determining which state's public
policy should predominate, the federal courts should utilize a center-
of-gravity analysis to determine which state has the greater interest in
the situation presented.
Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as now adopted by
Congress, appears to accord with these conclusions. Although the
Senate version of H.R. 5463 appears to have been better reasoned, the
House version which was adopted is not substantially different and is a
positive legislative development. The Supreme Court version of article V,
although virtuously conceived and painstakingly drafted, appears to have
been ill-considered and was correctly rejected.
145. Although the Senate Judiciary Committee's version may be the better drafted of the two,
the House version is workable and represents a positive legislative statement on the matter. The
Joint Conference specifically contemplated continued judicial interpretation and case-by-case
development of the scope of rule 501. Thus, upon presenting the Official Conference Report into
the Congressional Record, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice stated: "Rule 501 is not intended to freeze the law of privilege as it now exists ... [It] is
intended to provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case
basis." 120 Cong. Rec. H. 12,254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
Hopefully the courts will give credence to the views expressed by Professor Moore and the
Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the potentially confusing aspects of new rule 501, and will
construe rule 501 so as to prevent or resolve such confusion-in accordance with their sugges-
tions. If not, Congress should correct the confusion promptly by amending the rule along the lines
suggested in the Senate Judiciary Committee's Hearings and Report, as noted above.
